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The paper analyzes the performance of the Japanese economy from
1985 to 1999. It compares different explanations of slow growth
and prolonged recession. Using both bivariate comparisons and 
statistical tests, the paper concludes that the maintained growth rate
fell after 1992. Also, the data suggest that the recession early in the
1990s was induced by a decline in money growth. In contrast, the
recent recession was induced mainly by a fall in real exports. Failure
to allow the nominal exchange rate to depreciate forced deflation
and increased the costs of adjusting to reduced export demand. The
main policy conclusion calls on the Bank of Japan to pursue a 
more expansive policy to end deflation. This policy would depreciate
the yen, but it would end the deflation that is costly to Japan and 
its neighbors.
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Enterprise Institute.I. Introduction
Compared to its performance from the 1950s through the 1980s or to the U.S. 
economy in the 1990s, Japan’s growth rate has been sluggish. Growth declined from
an average of 10 percent for the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, to 4 percent for the
1970s and 1980s, to about 1 percent for the 1990s. For the first time since the very
early postwar years, Japan’s growth rate has been below U.S. growth for a protracted
period. The convergence of the economies that had become a stylized fact of the
postwar era has ended, at least temporarily.
Several very different explanations have been offered. One common explanation
cites changes in banks’ willingness to lend as a major cause of sustained sluggishness
of investment. Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) present evidence suggesting that this
explanation applies mainly to small firms. They show that the decline in lending
explains only a small part of the slowdown in growth of investment and income.
These authors conclude that real factors are more important than financial factors,
but they do not explain which real factors are most important or why they declined.
I find the argument about banks’ unwillingness to lend puzzling for two 
reasons. First, it does not fit well with another common argument about Japanese
banking—that banks went heavily into real estate lending in the 1980s because, after
deregulation, corporate borrowers greatly reduced their reliance on banks. Second,
evidence from many countries suggests that loans, including very risky loans, increase
in weakened financial systems with many insolvent banks. This is the familiar moral
hazard argument.
Both of these arguments suggest that much of the decline in lending reflected
reduced demand for loans. Below, I present some modest evidence that supports
Motonishi and Yoshikawa’s finding that an autonomous shift in banks’ willingness to
lend is not a principal factor affecting recovery.
There is no shortage of alternative explanations. Widely discussed explanations
include overvaluation of the yen or the expectation of future appreciation
(McKinnon [1999]), a liquidity trap that eliminates the effectiveness of monetary
policy (Krugman [1999]), collapse of the bubble in stock or land prices affecting
investment and housing (many authors), and pessimism about future pensions and
job security (Nakayama [1999]), cited in Motonishi and Yoshikawa [1999]. I con-
sider some of these below. Before doing so, it seems useful to present some basic data
both to show what happened to the economy and to dispel the frequent, mistaken
claim that the economy is in a deep depression, similar to the 1930s depression in the
United States.
Behind the many suggestions about the causes of slow growth and recession lie
different implicit or explicit ideas about the transmission process. For example, those
who suggest that weakness of the financial structure and bank failures are causal must
believe that restrictions by banks lowered investment and output. Whatever power
this explanation may have is limited to the last half of the decade, so it is at most a
partial explanation.
The liquidity trap explanation can apply, at most, to the last two years. Short-
term interest rates remained above 2 percent until 1995 and did not approach zero or
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a liquidity trap in a model with one interest rate. It is more difficult in a multi-asset
world unless all asset prices reach an equilibrium consistent with the zero short-term
interest rate (Brunner and Meltzer [1968]).
McKinnon (1999) makes a related claim. He argues that Japan cannot depreciate
its exchange rate. He notes that, except for 1980–85, the yen has appreciated against
the U.S. dollar and other currencies. Everyone anticipates long-term yen apprecia-
tion, in part because depreciation would arouse the ire of the United States, which
would retaliate by restricting imports from Japan. Since everyone believes the 
yen cannot depreciate, the Bank of Japan cannot depreciate its currency. With the
short-term rate near zero, depreciation does not offer an alternative channel by which
monetary expansion could end the recession.
At best, McKinnon’s argument is incomplete. It applies to the nominal exchange
rate, not the relevant, real exchange rate. If everyone believed and acted as McKinnon
assumes, the Bank could deflate to adjust an overvalued real exchange rate. Or, it
could end deflation and depreciate its currency. U.S. threats cannot prevent that.
In fact, the real exchange rate shows no evidence for the 1990s of the persistent
appreciation that McKinnon’s reasoning requires. The real, trade-weighted yen
exchange rate in 1997–98 differs little from the rate in 1985–86 and in many inter-
vening years. The rate fluctuates but shows no evidence of persistent appreciation or
depreciation since the mid-1980s.
Many explanations of the 1990s attribute slow growth to “bursting the bubble.”
Some of these explanations attribute a large role to asset prices—particularly equity,
land, and housing prices. I have long held that these prices have an important role in
the transmission process, so I welcome the attention they receive (Brunner and
Meltzer [1968], and Meltzer [1995]). I note, however, that housing and land prices
continue to decline, a finding that is more consistent with deflationary policy than
with a liquidity trap. Asset prices respond endogenously to productivity, policy, and
other impulses. I comment briefly on the role of asset prices below.
1
The theme of this conference is “The Role of Monetary Policy under Low
Inflation.” Divergent explanations of slow growth and recession based on lending,
interest rates, exchange rates, asset prices, or other variables suggest that economists
hold different views about that theme. Japan in the 1990s provides a case study from
which we can learn. I begin by presenting some of the principal facts. The data 
suggest that the transmission process has several familiar features. I do not attempt a
complete model of the economy. I have limited my inquiries to the modest objective
of looking for clues about some of the forces at work in Japan during the 1990s.
The data suggest some reasons for slow growth and recession and suggest a role
for policy. The Bank of Japan is not responsible for choosing the exchange rate and,
judging from its discussion and analysis, it does not give much attention to the
exchange rate. I conclude that this is a costly oversight that reflects an institutional
constraint that should be removed.
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1. Figure 10 of Okina et al. (2001) shows that other countries experienced sizeable reductions in stock market
indexes without having prolonged recessions. Claims that “bursting the bubble” caused slow growth and recession
have to consider why Japan differs in this respect.II. Some Facts and Interpretations
The data in this chapter help to dispel a common assertion, call attention to some
apparent regularities, and suggest what needs to be explained. Contrary to frequent
comments, Japan is not in a depression comparable to the Great Depression of the
1930s. Japan’s GDP did not decline by 25 to 30 percent over four years, as in the
United States in 1929–33. The largest decline is 3 percent in 1998, the year in which
many of Japan’s principal customers had deep recessions.
Figure 1 compares GDP growth in the United States for 1930–39 to growth in
Japan from 1989 to 1998. U.S. real GDP fell at a 10 to 15 percent annual rate for
more than three years before making a strong recovery. Japan’s growth rate is positive
in most years, but there is no sign to date of a strong recovery. Including recessions,
growth averaged about 1 percent from 1991 to 1998. This compares to average rates
of growth of about 10 percent from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s and 4 percent
from 1973 to 1990. Some evidence suggests that part of the reduction in growth rate
will persist.































Figure 1  Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Figure 1 suggests that Japan experienced two distinct declines in the 1990s. One
ended in 1993. A mild recovery followed with rates of GDP growth below the rate of
earlier recoveries. A second, deeper recession began in 1997 and deepened in 1998
and 1999, at the time of the Asian crisis.
One challenge is to explain the two recessions. A second challenge is to explain
why the growth rate has remained comparatively low for a decade. Recession is not
the main answer to the second challenge. Even if we exclude the three years with zero
or negative growth rates of per capita GDP, average growth for 1991 to 1998 rises
only to 2.6 percent, well below previous recoveries.
Figure 2 compares long-term interest rates for the United States in the 1930s 
to Japan in the 1990s. Despite the deeper depression in the United States, long-
term rates reached a lower level and fell much more in Japan, in part a reflection 
of the higher level they reached, in part the influence of the continuing decline 17
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Figure 3  Real Nonresidential Investment Growth and Real GDP Growth, Japan,
1975/I–1998/IV
in many price indexes after 1992. Long-term rates and the term spread rose in 
1994, suggesting that near the start of the recovery markets anticipated that 
the recovery would continue. The movement of long-term rates and the term spread
suggests that the public may have believed that the economy had completed its
adjustment to the bubble. The real rate of interest remained modest after the early
years of the decade.
Japan in the 1990s had higher growth and milder recessions than the United
States in the Great Depression. It also had more deflation and lower long-term 
interest rates at the end of the decade. Further comparison to the United States in the
1930s finds more differences than similarities. The rest of the data in this section are
for Japan in the 1990s.
Figure 3 compares growth of real, nonresidential investment to GDP growth since
1975. The two series generally move together for the entire quarter-century. The synchronous movement continued in the 1990s; qualitatively, the decade does not
seem exceptional. However, the duration and amplitude of the rise in investment in
the 1990s are both smaller than in earlier cycles, and the declines are much deeper
and longer. Average investment for the decade is much lower as a consequence.
The preliminary conclusions I draw from Figure 3 are that the two recessions 
in the 1990s were deeper than earlier declines and lasted longer. The recovery in 
mid-decade was milder. Investment rose less rapidly and did not repeat the rates 
of increase sustained in the two previous decades. Slower growth of both real, non-
residential investment and GDP suggests that the 1990s are not a unique period
unrelated to earlier experience. If this inference is correct, it focuses attention on low
investment as a main reason for slower growth.
To pursue this inference, I estimated a simple production equation using quarterly
values of four-quarter moving averages for the period 1975 to 1989. The basic 
equation relates output per worker to capital per worker. The estimation uses 
logarithmic first differences; growth of GDP per worker depends on investment
(growth of capital) per worker. Figure 4 shows out-of-sample differences between
actual and predicted real GDP growth per worker in the 1990s. The equation is
shown in the Appendix.
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Note: Sample period for model 1975/I–1989/IV. Growth rates measured year on year.
Figure 4  Difference between Actual and Predicted GDP Growth per Worker with
Predicted Growth Based on Per Capita Investment, Japan, 1990/I–1998/IV
Figure 4 has three distinct periods. First, in 1990–91, actual and predicted GDP
growth are similar. The past relation continues out of sample. Investment rose at an
annual rate of 10 percent or more and GDP growth fluctuated around 3.5 percent.
Second, from 1991 to 1997, the equation generally underestimates growth of real
GDP. GDP growth per worker falls less in 1991–93 than the past relation to growth
of capital per worker. The strength of the expansion in 1996 is greater than 
predicted. Third, in 1997–98, the equation overestimates. GDP growth fell more
than predicted in the recession that includes the Asian crisis.Let me turn now to some possible explanations of these differences. I selected two
variables to represent monetary actions and external events or shocks. Growth of the
real value of the monetary base is the monetary variable. In my (unfinished) work on
the history of the Federal Reserve and elsewhere, I have found that growth of the real
monetary base affected real income growth even in periods with nominal interest
rates close to zero (Meltzer [1999]). To represent external events, I chose growth of
real exports.
Movements of the two variables are highly suggestive about the differences
between actual and expected real GDP growth in the 1990s. Figure 5 shows monthly
values of annual rates of change in the real value of the monetary base. The consumer
price index converts nominal to real values. Changes in nominal base growth 
dominate movements of the series. Four distinct periods are visible.
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Figure 5  Year-on-Year Real Base Growth, Japan, 1985/I–1999/IV
First, the base accelerated under exchange rate management following the Plaza
and Louvre agreements of 1985 and 1987. The yen appreciated against the U.S. 
dollar and other currencies in 1985–86 under the Plaza Agreement (and before). 
The trade-weighted real exchange rate rose 37 percent in five quarters as the U.S.
dollar depreciated. The Louvre Accord in 1987 temporarily ended nominal yen
appreciation; instead of permitting the capital inflow to appreciate the yen, the Bank
of Japan, acting under the political agreement, purchased U.S. dollars, raising the
growth of the monetary base. The nominal and real value of Japanese equities soared.
The real value of the Nikkei index rose at 20 to 40 percent annual rates. Investment
and GDP expanded rapidly beginning in 1987 (see Figure 3).
The agreements were partly based on a faulty economic premise and partly on a
possibly correct political premise. Politically, the U.S. current account deficit raised
the possible threat that the U.S. Congress would restrict Japanese, and perhaps other,
imports. The nominal U.S. current account deficit was US$125 billion in 1985 androse to US$150 billion in 1986. It has since doubled in nominal value and increased
as a percentage of GDP.
The economic rationale was faulty. The nominal exchange rate has, at most, a
temporary influence on the real value of exports and imports. Nominal depreciation
of the U.S. dollar cannot permanently reduce the U.S. current account deficit or
Japan’s surplus. The United States continues to have greater investment opportunities
than it can finance with its own saving, so it borrows and sells assets. Japan has a 
relatively high saving rate, both compared to the United States and compared to its
domestic investment opportunities, so it exports capital and has a trade surplus. This
symbiotic relation between the United States and Japan continues.
Second, the principal effect of the Plaza and Louvre agreements was to shift
Japanese policy first to appreciation of the yen and then to inflation. The Bank of
Japan was not willing to tolerate the inflation. Monetary policy shifted direction in
1991. Real base growth fell to zero from the 6 to 10 percent annual rate of increase
realized in 1988–90. Interest rates rose. The yield curve inverted; the economy went
into recession from 1991 to 1993, and the stock market boom collapsed. The Nikkei
average fell 50 percent from its peak in two years.
Third, in 1992, the period of zero or negative real base growth ended. Real 
base growth began to rise gradually until it reached 8 percent in 1996. As shown in
Figure 3, the turning point in the economy was in 1993, a few months after real 
base growth began to increase.
Fourth, monetary actions contributed to the start of the recession at the end of
the decade, but they are not the main cause. From 1996 to 1999, annual growth of
the real base fluctuated within two percentage points of 6 percent. There are notable
periods of sharp decline, especially in early 1999 and in 1997, when the government
increased tax rates to reduce the budget deficit. Below, I consider the role of 
monetary policy in this period.
Falling exports are the major shock affecting Japan in the late 1990s. Real exports
fell from a 15 percent annual rate of increase in the spring of 1997 to negative values
a year later. Exports fell for several quarters, an unusual event in postwar Japan. The
decline in real exports follows the collapse of several Asian economies. The export
decline worsened after the Asian recession reached the Republic of Korea, a large pur-
chaser from and supplier to Japan. With the recovery in several Asian economies,
export growth resumed. Figure 6 shows these data.
Falling exports also contributed to the decline in real GDP in 1987. However,
export growth did not fall in 1991–92; exports helped to reduce the contractive
effects of monetary policy in this period. Falling export growth may have prolonged
the recession in 1993 after the monetary base started to expand.
While changes in exports contribute to growth and decline, turning points in
export growth typically follow, rather than precede, turning points in growth of
investment and real GDP in these years. Real export growth responds both to
autonomous or policy induced changes in foreign demand and to changes in
Japanese policies affecting the real exchange rate. There are, in addition, changes in
Japan’s foreign aid, grants, and loans to developing countries. Often foreign aid
finances exports.
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Note: Exchange rate measured as a value of foreign currencies in relation to the yen, 
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Figure 7  Real Total Export Growth versus Rate of Change of Real Effective
Exchange Rate, Japan, 1976/I–1998/IV
2. From a peak of 8.74 percent in June 1996, the growth rate of the real base fell in April 1997. The quarterly 
average shows a smaller drop.
The 1997 recession started early in the year, following the tax increase and a 
sustained decline in growth of the real monetary base.
2 Growth of real exports turned
negative in third quarter 1997 and remained negative through most of 1998. The
annual moving average fell from above 15 percent to –6 percent in six quarters.
Figure 7 shows the relation between year-on-year changes in real exports and the
real exchange rate. Changes in the real rate are inverted (yen per foreign currency) in
this figure; a falling line is an appreciation of the yen.The figure shows no uniform pattern over the period. In 1979, 1986–87, and
1994, export growth fell as the yen appreciated. In 1976–77, 1991, and 1998, export
growth moved opposite to the exchange rate; appreciation accompanied rising
exports and conversely.
Let me sum up these preliminary findings. I find that real GDP growth is closely
related to growth of real nonresidential investment. The data suggest that the 1990s
were not very different from earlier periods in this regard. Two principal differences
are that recessions in the 1990s were deeper and longer than in previous decades and,
on average, the maintained growth rate of real GDP declined.
Two factors—one monetary, one real—appear to have had a major role in the two
recessions and possibly the slower growth of non-recession years in the 1990s. The
monetary explanation seems most important for the beginning and end of the 
so-called bubble period. Large changes in nominal and real base growth preceded the
economic boom of the late 1980s and the recession in the early 1990s. A decline 
of more than 20 percent in real export growth was a main factor deepening and 
prolonging the recession at the end of the decade. Recovery in export growth in 1999
and 2000 helped to end the recession.
Of the two factors, the monetary factor has a straightforward interpretation. The
Bank of Japan, acting under Ministry of Finance direction, was too slow to raise
interest rates and lower base growth in the late 1980s, and it tightened too much in
the early 1990s. At the end of the decade, the Bank followed a gradual policy of
monetary expansion but did not prevent deflation. Influenced for a time by the
Ministry of Finance, the Bank moderated or prevented yen depreciation and at times
permitted appreciation.
Real export growth responds to domestic and foreign influences. The recession
that started early in 1997 would likely have remained brief and mild if the Asian
economies had continued to grow. Recessions in the countries of principal Asian 
customers lowered real GDP growth. Policy permitted investment to fall sharply 
at the same time. To move the analysis forward, we need to go beyond the binary
comparisons shown in the figures.
III. Growth of Real Investment, Real Exchange Rate, and Real
Balances
This chapter uses some of the relations in the previous chapter to study how the growth
of real investment and the real exchange rate respond to policy actions and other 
variables. Since investment and income change together, it is convenient to work with
growth of real, nonresidential investment as a measure of economic fluctuations. Unless
otherwise noted, all variables are quarterly observations measured as relative rates of
change from the previous year and expressed as annual rates of change.
Table 1 shows two estimates of an equation relating growth of real investment to
the growth in real long-term interest rate on government bonds, real GDP, and the real
trade-weighted exchange rate. The first set of estimates uses overlapping four-quarter
moving averages. The second uses only the four-quarter moving average for the fourth
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there is considerable serial correlation in the error terms in the full set of estimates. 
The coefficient on the AR(1) correction suggests the extent of serial correlation. The
estimates for the fourth quarter give less weight to the AR(1) correction.
The fourth-quarter estimates suggest that growth of investment is elastic with
respect to the rate of change of long-term interest rates. Both sets of estimates 
suggest strong response to GDP growth, as suggested by Figure 3. The dramatic
changes in the real exchange rate have neither a large nor a reliable effect, given
growth of interest rates and GDP. The findings for investment growth are consistent
with a neoclassical framework and the standard transmission process.
Changes in the monetary base are linked to the economy through a number of
channels. An increase in the base lowers the short-term interest rate, depreciates the
exchange rate, and changes expectation about future prices and spending. The size 
of the responses depends critically on the anticipations held in the market before the
change occurs and, therefore, on the central bank’s transparency and credibility. In
principle, the central bank’s actions may be fully anticipated; in practice, there is
uncertainty at least about timing. In Japan, investors must take account also of the
Ministry of Finance’s control of the exchange rate. The Ministry and the Bank 
may have different objectives, so that policy shifts between inflation and exchange
rate targets.
The Bank of Japan was not fully independent during the 1990s. If the Bank’s
decisions to change interest rates and growth of the monetary base resulted in more
change in the exchange rate than the Ministry would accept, the Ministry told the
Bank to control the exchange rate. Revision of the Bank of Japan Law to increase the
Bank’s independence left the Ministry responsible for exchange rate policy.
For current purposes, the importance of this arrangement is its effect on the 
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Note: All variables are annual growth rates of real values. t-statistics are below the coefficients.market’s belief about the Bank’s actions. The Bank may have been committed to 
end deflation, but it could be effective only if its actions were consistent with 
the Ministry’s exchange rate target or target zone. When the two objectives were
inconsistent, the Bank had to yield to the Ministry.
Table 2 presents evidence that the rise or fall of the real exchange rate depends on
the difference between growth of Japan’s monetary base and the U.S. monetary base.
Both bases are in real terms, deflated by respective consumer price indexes. Ideally,
growth of the trade-weighted monetary base should replace the U.S. monetary base.
Many of Japan’s principal trading partners had exchange rates pegged to the U.S. 
dollar during much of the period considered, however.
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Table 2  Percent Changes in the Real Exchange Rate in Japan, 1979–98
All observations Fourth quarter only
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 3.85 (0.98) 2.46 (0.82) 4.13 (1.08)
Diff. in base growth (t) 1.25 (2.95) 1.04 (1.97) 1.93 (2.55)
Diff. in base growth (t–1) 1.19 (2.78) 0.71 (0.98) 0.24 (0.33)
Diff. in real GDP growth (t) 0.13 (0.25) –0.04 (0.06) –0.58 (0.58)
Diff. in real GDP growth (t–1) 0.20 (0.41) 0.68 (1.12) –0.37 (0.37)
Diff. in change in real interest rate –0.34 (0.53) 0.49 (0.98) 0.81 (1.11)
AR (1) 0.82 (10.21) 0.68 (8.18) 0.26 (0.88)
R2/DW 0.78/ 1.69 0.63/ 1.87 0.47/ 1.85
Notes: 1. All variables are quarterly values of year-to-year percentage changes. Differences are taken 
relative to the United States. t-statistics are in parentheses.
2. With respect to diff. in change in real interest rate, column (1) uses short-term rates; columns
(2) and (3) use long-term rates. Columns (1) and (2) use overlapping four-quarter moving
averages. Column (3) uses fourth-quarter annual moving averages only.
The results in Table 2 suggest that increases and decreases in the growth of Japan’s
monetary base, relative to growth of the U.S. monetary base, have relatively large,
persistent effects on the rate of change of the exchange rate. Holding differences in
interest rates and output constant, the rate of depreciation increases when the
Japanese real base accelerates relative to the U.S. real base.
The table reports responses to differences in rates of change of short-term interest
rates in column (1) and long-term rates in columns (2) and (3). Responses to acceler-
ation of the domestic interest rates relative to U.S. rates are not significant. This
result may be due to neglect of simultaneity, or use of U.S. interest rates to proxy 
for world rates, or failure to distinguish anticipated and unanticipated changes. 
The data suggest that the relative growth rate of the base adequately summarizes the
information in monetary action and that acceleration or deceleration of the base is
unanticipated to a considerable extent at least as to timing.
Table 2 also relates rates of change of the trade-weighted real exchange rate to 
differences in rates of GDP growth between Japan and the United States. Properly,
multi-country averages should replace U.S. rates of change on the right side of the
estimation. An index of real growth for Japan’s trading partners might strengthen the
effect of differences in real growth rates.A major issue in Japan at the end of the 1990s concerns the effect of monetary
policy when the short-term interest rate is close to zero. A broader issue, raised in the
theme of the conference, is how monetary policy works in a period of low inflation
or deflation. The evidence in Table 2 suggests that monetary actions affect the
exchange rate. Table 3 considers whether changes in the exchange rate affect the
demand for money and, by inference, other variables.
3
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Table 3  Growth of Demand for Base Money in Japan, 1979–98
All observations Fourth quarter only
Constant 5.27 (3.04) 5.58 (3.12) 7.53 (3.84)
Short rate –0.32 (1.32) –0.28 (1.24) –0.84 (2.12)
Real GDP 0.37 (2.22) 0.35 (2.29) 0.65 (1.78)
Nominal exchange rate –0.10 (4.25) –0.09 (1.36)
AR (1) 0.87 (14.91) 0.89 (16.54) 0.51 (2.01)
R2/DW 0.82/ 1.46 0.86/ 1.79 0.58/ 1.64
Note: All variables are quarterly values of annual rates of change. t-statistics are in parentheses.
3. The short-term rate is available in the data source only from the fourth quarter of 1979.
As shown in the table, I estimated the equation with and without the rate of
change of the nominal exchange rate. Not shown are similar estimates with changes
in long-term rates in place of changes in short-term rates. The interest rate variable
reaches the customary 5 percent significance level using annual rate of change for the
fourth quarter only. Growth of the nominal exchange rate has a coefficient of about
–0.1. On average, increased exchange rate appreciation increases growth of the
demand for money, and conversely. Taken together, tables 2 and 3 suggest that 
the exchange is relatively elastic in response to the base, but the demand for base 
is relatively inelastic with respect to the exchange rate. This is consistent with the 
relatively large observed changes in the exchange rate.
The data suggest that a 10 percent greater depreciation of the nominal trade-
weighted yen reduces growth in demand for real base by about 1 percent on average.
Annual changes in the exchange rate of 10 to 20 percent in both directions are not
unusual. Large-scale appreciation of the yen in 1985–86 increased growth of the
demand for real base money; large-scale depreciation in 1978, 1989–90, and 1996
reduced growth of demand for real yen balances. The Sakakibara policy of appreciat-
ing the yen in 1998, after it had fallen, increased the demand for money.
The findings in this chapter contribute to an understanding of the transmission of
monetary policy in Japan. The exchange rate appears to be an important variable in
the transmission of monetary and other changes. The results suggest monetary action
is not adequately summarized by changes in a short-term interest rate. Investment
depends on the long-term rate. Real base growth affects growth of the real exchange
rate, given real interest rates, and changes in the nominal exchange rate affect growth
of the demand for base money. IV. Other Parts of the Story
Preceding pages suggest some possible ways in which cyclical and other changes 
in Japan during the low inflation or deflation of the 1990s affected growth of 
investment, output, and the demand for money. This chapter briefly considers 
two questions. Is there a basis to conclude that the maintained rate of real GDP
growth slowed in the 1990s? What role did fiscal actions and variables such as stock
prices, housing prices, and bank lending take? I have not attempted a full analysis 
of these variables but have limited my comments to suggestions for further analysis.
Japan is the second-largest economy in the world. It competes with the largest
economy (and others) in third countries and in home markets. Figure 8 shows one 
of the principal factors affecting that competition. In the 1990s, the index of unit
labor costs fell in the United States relative to Japan. The slope of the change appears
modest after 1993, but the only evidence of possible reversal is in 1999, and that 
evidence is tenuous.
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Figure 8  Ratio of Indices of Unit Labor Costs, United States versus Japan,
1985/I–1999/IV
The data show that, on a 1985 base, relative cost changes moved in favor of Japan
by 9 percent in the 1980s and early 1990s. The relative cost advantage disappeared in
1992. By mid-1993, the United States had increased its (relative) cost advantage by 5
to 6 percent and in 1998 by more than 10 percent. The nominal exchange rate did
not depreciate to offset the change in costs. This evidence suggests that the terms of
trade became less favorable to Japan.
A likely reason is that, after a long period of slow growth and adjustment, the
U.S. economy changed in the 1990s. New technologies, response to deregulation
that began in the 1970s, and the shift of the labor force from old to new and less 
regulated industries raised U.S. productivity growth. Japan has been slower to make
that transition. Rising productivity and slow growth of real and nominal wages in the
United States shifted the competitive advantage toward the United States.Reduction in real wage growth slows growth of unit labor costs. Figure 9 shows that
hourly real wage growth in Japan remained below 3 percent after 1992. If bonuses are
included, the decline is greater, and the change in real compensation turns negative in
1998–99. Falling nominal and real wages appear to be a deflationary response to slower
relative productivity growth and deflationary monetary policy.
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Figure 9  Real Wage Growth, Japan, 1985/I–1998/IV
Many discussions of the Japanese economy in the 1990s focus on the fall in bank
lending. The argument is that the unwillingness of banks to lend retarded growth of
spending and GDP.
This argument is incomplete. Japan is an open economy with a fluctuating
exchange rate. Capital flows vary over a wide range. Large Japanese corporations can
borrow abroad, and they do. Borrowing abroad declined in the 1990s suggesting that
the decline in lending reflected reduced demand to borrow. Consumption lending by
banks has been relatively small, or nonexistent, during most of the postwar era.
Further, Japanese households have maintained a high saving rate throughout the
decade. Lending gives less support to consumption spending in Japan than in the
United States. Studies of investment by small firms show, at most, a small effect of
lending on investment expenditure, as noted in the introduction (Motonishi and
Yoshikawa [1999]).
Reported loan losses by Japanese banks reached 5 percent of GDP. A large part 
of the financial system is insolvent. Some suggest that delay in closing or merging
insolvent banks slowed lending and delayed recovery. This is an unusual argument.
The more common argument is that insolvent banks lend actively and make risky
loans, responding to the moral hazard inherent in de facto or de jure deposit insurance
protection and negative net worth.
For these reasons, I am skeptical that reluctance to lend was a powerful factor in
Japan’s slow growth and recession. The basic data give little support. Figure 10 shows
that growth of lending can either lead or lag growth of real GDP. In 1997–99, lend-
ing growth lagged behind GDP growth. This suggests that, with a lag, borrowersbecame less willing to borrow when income declined. The figure also suggests that
there is not much relation between growth of lending and output after the middle of
the decade. Lending growth remained close to zero during the economic recovery in
1995–97. The binary comparison cannot rule out a marginal affect of lending on
output, but it shows no evidence of this channel.
To test the lending effect, I added growth of the real value of loans and discounts
to the investment equation shown in Table 1. The coefficient on loans is negative
and not significant. The Appendix shows the estimate. This finding could change in
a more complete analysis that separates the presumed positive effect of lending
growth on investment growth from the effect of expected income or GDP growth on
lending growth.
Some economists claim Japan is in a liquidity trap. With the short-term interest
rate close to zero, they claim, monetary action is powerless to change the price level
or economic activity. This claim implies that central bank purchases of long-term
debt, equities, foreign exchange, or other assets would have no effect on nominal
GDP, investment, or other variables of interest.
In a static model of a closed economy with only three types of assets—money,
bonds, and capital—the model solves for one relative price, typically the interest rate
on bonds or bills. If this price cannot be reduced—for example, below zero—
increases in money do not affect the economy by changing interest rates. The real
balance effect on spending is small, so real balance or wealth effects on spending
introduce only a minor qualification.
I have argued that the liquidity trap proposition depends on the assumption that
all asset prices have fully adjusted to the zero rate of interest.
4 No one in the economy
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Figure 10  Growth in Real Loans and Discounts versus Real GDP Growth, Japan,
1975/I–1998/IVis willing to change their mix of current and future consumption or current and
future production in response to an increase in money achieved by purchasing some
asset or assets. The central bank cannot raise any asset price by buying more of that
asset in exchange for money.
Evidence from deflations in 1937–38 or 1948 in the United States does not 
support the liquidity trap. Instead, the data suggest that, with deflationary monetary
policy and the short-term rate close to zero, the price level continued to fall. The 
fall was similar to the fall in 1920–21 under deflationary monetary policy with 
a non-zero interest rate (Meltzer [1999]). Falling prices increase the value of real 
balances, producing a small direct effect on spending. A much larger effect comes
through changes in the relative prices of assets and output, in long-term real interest
rates, and the exchange rate. All that is required for these effects to operate is that 
all asset markets are not fully adjusted to the zero interest rate. Evidence from 
many studies supports the claim that the term structure, uncovered interest parity, or
bond and equity markets do not satisfy the condition that information is always and
everywhere fully exploited.
5
During the recession at the end of the decade, the Japanese government engaged
in expansive fiscal policy. Fiscal policy shifted from the goal of closing the budget
deficit, or providing a surplus, to a policy of promoting recovery by public invest-
ment and consumption spending. The spending policy leaves Japan with a relatively
large stock of outstanding debt and a large unfunded liability for future pensions and
health care. The longer-term effect of the policy on growth and capital formation has
been the subject of considerable discussion.
A puzzling feature of the heavy reliance on continued fiscal expansion is the 
relatively small response of GDP. The reported government deficit has moved from
close to balance in 1990 to more than 10 percent of nominal GDP in 1999. The
decline is steady, except for the small reversal following the 1997 tax increase.
Data from the family income and expenditure survey show that the average
propensity to consume fell as the deficit to GDP ratio rose. I can offer two, non-
competing explanations. One is Ricardian equivalence. The public does not 
distinguish between personal and public debt; as the public debt rises, saving rises.
This process may have been at work, but I suggest another.
A growing segment of the population is approaching retirement. This postwar
generation saved at a comparatively high rate for its retirement and invested in 
housing and equities. The 40 to 50 percent decline in equity prices from the stock
market peak, and the similar decline in prices of housing and other assets, lowered
the wealth of this generation. The public has been told repeatedly about the 
importance of budget surpluses to provide for the pensions and health care that 
the government promised. Instead, the government ran very large deficits.
As public debt mounted, the risk increased that the government would have to
renege partially on its pension and health care promises. The public responded by
increasing saving relative to GDP, offsetting part of the effect of fiscal stimulus.
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5. McCallum (2000) develops this argument rigorously for the exchange rate on the assumption that uncovered
interest parity does not hold at every point.Believing their pensions were threatened, households tried to restore personal wealth.
The more they responded this way, the smaller the effect of fiscal expansion on GDP.
The government’s response was to further increase the fiscal deficit absolutely and as
a percentage of GDP.
Further, much of the fiscal stimulus took the form of public works with low 
contribution to productivity and high maintenance cost. A rational person could not
believe that today’s government spending would yield higher future incomes that
would pay the unfunded liabilities for pensions and health care or service the debt.
Perhaps tax cuts that helped the public to restore its desired wealth position would
have helped the public to achieve its goal and, thus, slow the increase in the saving
rate. Deregulation that increased efficiency and productivity would have had a 
positive effect also. If correct, the conjectures would relate fiscal actions and asset
prices to saving and consumption in this period.
V. Conclusion: The Transmission Process at Low Inflation
During most of the 1990s, the measured rate of change in the GDP deflator
remained below a 2 percent annual rate. For much of the period after 1994, the
deflator fell modestly on average. By 1998, all short-term interest rates were 
0.5 percent or lower. Although there were additional reductions to zero, the central
bank’s ability to reduce short-term rates meaningfully ended.
If the transmission of monetary impulses depends on first changing short-term
interest rates, monetary expansion would have no effect in the circumstances of Japan
in the late 1990s. Although it is often useful to think of monetary actions as working
through a single interest rate, this is a property of the models we use, not an empiri-
cally verified proposition about Japan or any other economy at a zero or near zero
interest rate and perhaps elsewhere. The available evidence suggests that relations
such as the pure expectations theory of the term structure, uncovered interest parity,
the effect of interest rates on stock prices, and of changes in reproduction costs equal
to changes in asset prices do not hold always and everywhere. Prices determined in
active markets adjust most rapidly, other prices more slowly. All price and asset
adjustments are part of the transmission process by which monetary (and other)
impulses respond to current and anticipated future actions of the monetary authority.
Based on my preliminary examination of evidence from Japan in the 1990s, two
types of change occurred. The maintained growth rate slowed. Japan’s cost of produc-
tion rose relative to U.S. production costs. To restore the 1980s growth rate required
either increased productivity growth, real currency depreciation, or deflation. Japan’s
policy makers, by choice or accident, chose deflation over currency depreciation.
Growth of the real and nominal monetary base remained positive after 1993, but
monetary growth was not high enough to avoid deflation as a means of adjusting
asset prices and the real exchange rate.
In a deflationary environment, households and businesses increase real cash 
balances to earn the return from deflation. Japan in 1996–97 illustrates that 
outcome. Real balances rose absolutely and relative to income and output. The real,
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6 percent year on year. The expansion ended in a mistaken fiscal action followed by
collapse of export growth as several Asian economies went into deep recession and
the world economy slowed. Monetary growth was a supporting force on average but
was insufficient to prevent real and nominal exchange rate appreciation in 1998, to
depreciate the exchange rate in 1999, or to satisfy the increased demand for base
money as the risk of financial failures rose.
I suggest that exchange rate policy is the main reason that monetary policy has
been deflationary. The Bank does not control exchange rate policy; the Ministry of
Finance has that responsibility. The data show that if the Bank increases money
growth relative to U.S. money growth, exchange rate depreciation increases. During
most of the 1990s, the Ministry of Finance did not permit sustained depreciation of
the nominal yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate. Growth of the monetary base had to 
satisfy the exchange rate constraint. The public understood the constraint on 
monetary expansion. The Bank’s fault was to ignore, at least publicly, the constraint
on its actions and, later in the decade, to oppose purchases of foreign exchange.
Monetary policy cannot generally achieve two goals, an exchange rate band and
price stability. The exchange rate goal imposed deflation on Japan. Prices had to fall
enough to reduce real wages, the real exchange rate, and other real variables. With
monetary expansion limited by exchange rate policy, deflation enabled the public to
satisfy its increased demand for money, the latter induced in part by financial fragility
and banking failures, in part by the return from deflation.
I draw four policy implications. First, the government and Bank should decide 
on a single goal for monetary policy, either control the exchange rate or the rate of
inflation. Monetary policy can achieve either goal at low social cost, but it cannot
generally reach both goals. Either goal is preferable to the current policy of shifting
without warning from one to the other.
Second, increased money growth after the middle of the decade would have raised
the actual and expected price level. Asset prices would have increased instead of
falling. Rising real estate and stock prices would have increased the asset values
underlying bank loans, thereby reducing losses to banks, improving banks’ balance
sheets, and reducing the demand for real money balances. Stable or rising real estate
prices would have stopped the decline in households’ wealth and changed the 
expectation that housing and other assets would be cheaper in the future, thereby
increasing demand for these assets.
Third, an adaptive rule for growth of the monetary base would have responded
sooner to deflation, to the slower average rate of real growth and to the increased
demand for money per unit of income. Even if not rigidly followed, the rule, or 
policy guide, would have led the Bank to respond sooner and more effectively to 
the deflation and recession that followed the decline in exports in 1997–98.
Fourth, an adaptive policy rule for price stability meets the objective expressed 
in the Bank of Japan Law. At a zero short-term interest rate, the Bank should buy 
foreign exchange to expand monetary growth until deflation ends. The Ministry of
Finance should accept the currency depreciation or appreciation needed to meet the
Bank’s objective of zero or low inflation.
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policy faces is the choice of an appropriate exchange rate anchor. Japan has a chronic
excess of saving over investment. If the exchange rate is not free to respond to
changes in the excess supply of saving, the price level must rise or fall to adjust 
the real exchange rate. Influenced partly by pressure from abroad, the Ministry 
has insisted on a nominal exchange rate in recent years that requires deflation. The
social cost has taken the form of slow or negative growth, wasteful or unproductive
government expenditure, financial sector weakness, and rising unemployment.
Although the findings that I report require more careful empirical work than I
have attempted, the preliminary results are familiar. The exchange rate responds to
differences in rates of money growth. Investment responds to the long-term interest
rate, and the demand for money responds to both interest rates and exchange rates.
The policy transmission process works through short- and long-term interest rates,
exchange rates, and other relative prices. Expectations of future prices of assets 
and output are part of the transmission process also. The estimates suggest that the
interest elasticity of the demand for money is relatively large in Japan. The elasticity
may have increased at low interest rates. Qualitatively, and perhaps quantitatively,
other elements of the transmission process continued to function as before.
Figure 11 shows predicted and actual growth rates of investment. The predictions
are the values generated by the regression estimates shown in Table 1. All the predicted
values are within sample. The data suggest that the errors did not increase in recent
years. The same is true of the equations for the rate of change of the real exchange rate
in Table 2 and the rate of change of the demand for money in Table 3.
6
I close by noting two puzzling outcomes. First, the difference in interest rates
between the United States and Japan has persisted for several years. Deflation in 
Japan and modest inflation in the United States makes the real difference smaller 
than the more widely reported nominal difference. Is the expectation of continued
appreciation the answer? The difference remains to be explained. Second, the standard
prescription is to rely on expansive fiscal policy when the nominal short-term interest
rate is close to zero. Fiscal policy has been highly expansive for more than two years,
but the effect has been modest. I suggested an explanation for Japan based on low 
productivity of public investment, demographic changes, and wealth losses. Careful
research on this problem would increase understanding of the operation of fiscal 
policy as a supplement to monetary policy when market interest rates are low.
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6. Copies of the last two figures are available on request.33
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Figure 11  Actual Investment versus Table 1 Model
APPENDIX
Estimation of Growth of Output per Worker, 1975–89, Quarterly
Constant –1.04 (–0.38)
Real long rate –0.48 (–1.42)
Real GDP 1.64 (6.43)
Real GDPt–1 0.66 (2.75)
Real exchange rate –0.02 (–0.84)
Real exchange ratet–1 0.02 (0.78)




Estimation of the Effect of Lending Growth on Investment Growth, 1976/II–1998/IV
Constant 0.0006 (0.14)
Investment per worker 0.27 (4.92)
R
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